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 ﾠ 1	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠPolitics	 ﾠof	 ﾠOpting	 ﾠOut:	 ﾠ
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 ﾠeducational	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠand	 ﾠpopular	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
spending	 ﾠ
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 ﾠ
Torben	 ﾠIversen,	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 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Abstract:	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠpuzzles:	 ﾠWhy	 ﾠare	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐country	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdivision	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
labor	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠso	 ﾠlarge,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠare	 ﾠthey	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠsustainable	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlong	 ﾠterm?	 ﾠWe	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠplay	 ﾠa	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠshaping	 ﾠpolitico-ﾭ‐economic	 ﾠ
distributive	 ﾠcoalitions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoriginal	 ﾠdivision	 ﾠof	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠfinancing.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠPR	 ﾠsystems,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠlower	 ﾠand	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠformed	 ﾠa	 ﾠcoalition	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestablishment	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠ
share	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠfunding.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠmajoritarian	 ﾠsystems,	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠvoters	 ﾠaligned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
upper	 ﾠ income	 ﾠ class	 ﾠ and	 ﾠ support	 ﾠ private	 ﾠ education	 ﾠ spending	 ﾠ instead.	 ﾠOnce	 ﾠ established,	 ﾠ institutional	 ﾠ
arrangements	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠfeedback	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmicro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠof	 ﾠattitudes,	 ﾠreinforcing	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
among	 ﾠupper-ﾭ‐middle	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystems.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠhypotheses	 ﾠare	 ﾠtested	 ﾠempirically	 ﾠboth	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
micro	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmacro	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠwith	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠdata	 ﾠand	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠdata	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
ISSP	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ20	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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1.	 ﾠIntroduction:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpuzzle	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Preferences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠpolies	 ﾠare	 ﾠcommonly	 ﾠmodeled	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠrisk,	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
sometimes	 ﾠideological	 ﾠframes.	 ﾠAlmost	 ﾠnever	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠmodeled	 ﾠas	 ﾠone	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠ
alternatives.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠargue	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠavailability	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠalternatives,	 ﾠof	 ﾠopting	 ﾠout,	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠbig	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠpolicies.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠareas	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠpensions,	 ﾠold	 ﾠage	 ﾠ
care,	 ﾠhealthcare,	 ﾠdaycare,	 ﾠand,	 ﾠour	 ﾠfocus,	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠalternatives	 ﾠcompete	 ﾠwith	 ﾠeach	 ﾠ
other.	 ﾠBorrowing	 ﾠa	 ﾠterminology	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠHirschman,	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠthen	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ“voice”	 ﾠ(voting)	 ﾠbut	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
“exit”	 ﾠ(choosing	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠalternatives),	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠargue,	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformer.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Welfare	 ﾠstates	 ﾠvary	 ﾠgreatly	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠservices	 ﾠare	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
privately.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠpuzzle	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠis	 ﾠsupposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
spending	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠgradual	 ﾠphasing	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠservice	 ﾠprovision.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠas	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
spending	 ﾠrises,	 ﾠvoters	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠshoulder	 ﾠa	 ﾠrising	 ﾠtax	 ﾠburden	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠand	 ﾠwillingness	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoters	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
pay	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠservices	 ﾠin	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠservices	 ﾠshould	 ﾠcorrespondingly	 ﾠdecrease.	 ﾠInstead,	 ﾠvoters	 ﾠ
should	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠmore	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin	 ﾠimproving	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquality	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠservices.	 ﾠEmpirically,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
observe	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠvariation	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠin	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠservices	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠ
1).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠis	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠand	 ﾠfinanced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠmonies,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠin	 ﾠothers,	 ﾠvoters	 ﾠ
seem	 ﾠhappy	 ﾠto	 ﾠshoulder	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠinvestments	 ﾠthemselves.	 ﾠMoreover,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠsettings	 ﾠare	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠstable	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmost	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
equilibria.	 ﾠHow	 ﾠcan	 ﾠthis	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexplained?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠmatters	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnotable	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
distribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠwage,	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠwealth	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠPrivate	 ﾠalternatives	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠplay	 ﾠany	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomparative	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠliterature,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
least	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠa	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠdistributive	 ﾠoutcomes	 ﾠ(Busemeyer	 ﾠ
2014).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠwe	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠformation	 ﾠof	 ﾠdistributional	 ﾠ
coalitions,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdivision	 ﾠof	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠ
through	 ﾠa	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠlogic.	 ﾠOnce	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠspending	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“tilted”	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠor	 ﾠanother,	 ﾠ
complementarities	 ﾠin	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvest	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠreinforce	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠfunding,	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠover	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠpolicies.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠShare	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsources	 ﾠin	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠ2007.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Source:	 ﾠOECD,	 ﾠ2010:	 ﾠEducation	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠGlance,	 ﾠ233,	 ﾠ235.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠstark	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
spending	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠshould	 ﾠvary	 ﾠdepending	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠPR	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystems,	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠtransmitted	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfiscal	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠpush	 ﾠ
high-ﾭ‐income	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐quality	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠchildren,	 ﾠto	 ﾠpush	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠspending	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠto	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐income	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠmore	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠconsumption.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠis	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsecondary	 ﾠand	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠare	 ﾠstratified	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
concentrates	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrich	 ﾠ(Ansell	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠ2010;	 ﾠBusemeyer	 ﾠ2012).	 ﾠConversely,	 ﾠin	 ﾠmajoritarian	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠfinancing,	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠincome	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcan	 ﾠshoulder	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠ
costs	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠwill	 ﾠoppose	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠit	 ﾠundermines	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreturns	 ﾠon	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠ
investments,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐income	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠwho	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠafford	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠwill	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
spending	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠde	 ﾠfacto	 ﾠmore	 ﾠtargeted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠgroups.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠincome	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ
is	 ﾠhigh.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠour	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthis	 ﾠimplication,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠ
apply	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠspending	 ﾠareas.	 ﾠOur	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠframework	 ﾠis	 ﾠrooted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠparadigm,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠadd	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠcomponent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠby	 ﾠemphasizing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠnetworks	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ


















































































































































































































































Private	 ﾠShare	 ﾠin	 ﾠEduca on	 ﾠSpending,	 ﾠall	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠeduca on	 ﾠ
Private	 ﾠShare	 ﾠin	 ﾠEduca on	 ﾠSpending,	 ﾠter ary	 ﾠeduca on	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
p.	 ﾠ3),	 ﾠand	 ﾠour	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠexplains	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠ(although	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠapplicable	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
areas).	 ﾠWe	 ﾠtest	 ﾠit	 ﾠon	 ﾠboth	 ﾠmacro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠspending	 ﾠdata	 ﾠand	 ﾠmicro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠsample	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Western	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
2.	 ﾠExisting	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
After	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠhad	 ﾠlong	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠneglected	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomparative	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠscience	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠeconomy,	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
enjoyed	 ﾠgrowing	 ﾠscholarly	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠyears	 ﾠ(Busemeyer/Trampusch	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdebate	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Varieties	 ﾠof	 ﾠCapitalism	 ﾠ(VoC)	 ﾠplayed	 ﾠa	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠraising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠof	 ﾠmain-ﾭ‐stream	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠscience	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠtopics	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠof	 ﾠskills	 ﾠand	 ﾠtraining	 ﾠ(Culpepper	 ﾠ2003;	 ﾠFinegold/Soskice	 ﾠ1988;	 ﾠ
Iversen/Soskice	 ﾠ2001;	 ﾠStreeck	 ﾠ1989;	 ﾠThelen	 ﾠ2004).	 ﾠA	 ﾠfew	 ﾠcontributions	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
connection	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠskill	 ﾠformation	 ﾠregimes	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠstate	 ﾠ(Busemeyer/Nikolai	 ﾠ2010;	 ﾠEstévez-ﾭ‐
Abe	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2001;	 ﾠIversen/Stephens	 ﾠ2008),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexact	 ﾠnature	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠlinking	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠareas	 ﾠis	 ﾠstill	 ﾠunexplored.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Following	 ﾠAnsell	 ﾠ(2008,	 ﾠ2010),	 ﾠwe	 ﾠargue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠinvestments	 ﾠcan	 ﾠand	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
treated	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠcontentious	 ﾠissue	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠredistributive	 ﾠconflict	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐economic	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠpolicies.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthis	 ﾠargument,	 ﾠAnsell’s	 ﾠwork	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwork	 ﾠof	 ﾠothers	 ﾠ(Boix	 ﾠ1997,	 ﾠ
1998;	 ﾠBusemeyer	 ﾠ2007,	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠCastles	 ﾠ1989,	 ﾠ1998;	 ﾠSchmidt	 ﾠ2007)	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠand	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠinvestments	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠare	 ﾠstrongly	 ﾠshaped	 ﾠby	 ﾠpartisan	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠand	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbalance	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
power	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠpolitico-ﾭ‐economic	 ﾠinterests.	 ﾠPrivate	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending	 ﾠhas	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠstudied	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
extensively	 ﾠas	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠExceptions	 ﾠare	 ﾠWolf	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠand	 ﾠWolf	 ﾠand	 ﾠZohlnhöfer	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠwho	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠ
union	 ﾠdensity,	 ﾠpartisan	 ﾠpower	 ﾠand	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠheritage	 ﾠas	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠdeterminants	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠ
spending	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠYet	 ﾠthese	 ﾠauthors	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsimultaneous	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoting	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠagainst	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠand	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠa	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
interdependencies	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠchoices,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠof	 ﾠothers,	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠpartisanship.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
More	 ﾠrecently,	 ﾠscholars	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmoved	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmacro	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmicro	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠ
education	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠand	 ﾠ	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠchoices.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠsociology	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
comparative	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠdeterminants	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠmove	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstages	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠcareers	 ﾠ(for	 ﾠa	 ﾠrecent	 ﾠoverview	 ﾠand	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠ
see	 ﾠBreen	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠinsights	 ﾠinto	 ﾠhow	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠ
affect	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠstratification	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠBreen/Jonsson	 ﾠ2005;	 ﾠPfeffer	 ﾠ2008;	 ﾠStocké	 ﾠ2007),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
does	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(working-ﾭ‐age)	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠpreferred	 ﾠ
design	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠsystems.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdistinction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠand	 ﾠactual	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠeducations	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant,	 ﾠhowever.	 ﾠNew	 ﾠscholarship	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomparative	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠand	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠ
state	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠhas	 ﾠstarted	 ﾠto	 ﾠidentify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠdeterminants	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
education	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠ(Ansell	 ﾠ2010:	 ﾠChapter	 ﾠ4;	 ﾠBusemeyer	 ﾠ2012;	 ﾠBusemeyer	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠ
Busemeyer/Jensen	 ﾠ2012),	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠearlier	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠthat	 ﾠstudied	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfeedback	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠ
welfare	 ﾠstate	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠon	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠ(Andreß/Heien	 ﾠ2001;	 ﾠBlekesaune/Quadagno	 ﾠ2003;	 ﾠJaeger	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
2006,	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠSvallfors	 ﾠ1997,	 ﾠ2004,	 ﾠ2010).	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠis	 ﾠmixed,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠ
expectation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠliterature	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠfeedback	 ﾠeffects,	 ﾠcontributing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐
term	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠsustainability	 ﾠof	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠarrangements.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠseparated	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠare	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠby	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠpreferences;	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ
choices	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠinteract.	 ﾠ.	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠcontribution	 ﾠto	 ﾠthese	 ﾠliteratures	 ﾠis	 ﾠtwo-ﾭ‐fold.	 ﾠFirst	 ﾠwe	 ﾠadd	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠknowledge	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
institutional	 ﾠdeterminants	 ﾠof	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐country	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdivision	 ﾠof	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
education.	 ﾠSpecifically,	 ﾠbuilding	 ﾠon	 ﾠIversen	 ﾠand	 ﾠSoskice	 ﾠ(2006),	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠshaping	 ﾠpolitico-ﾭ‐economic	 ﾠdistributive	 ﾠcoalitions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐
national	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠinvestment.	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠgame-ﾭ‐theoretic	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠ
educational	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠoption	 ﾠto	 ﾠopt	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhas	 ﾠ
implications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠvoter	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠpolicies.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
preferences	 ﾠfocuses	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠand	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠ(Ansell	 ﾠ
2010;	 ﾠBusemeyer	 ﾠ2012;	 ﾠBusemeyer/Jensen	 ﾠ2012),	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsequence	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
network	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠchoices.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠpropose	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsection	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠpuzzle	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsolved	 ﾠusing	 ﾠan	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
educational	 ﾠinvestment.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠonly	 ﾠdemocracies	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠkey	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
electoral	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠYet	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠgo	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstrategically	 ﾠinterdependent	 ﾠ
behavior	 ﾠof	 ﾠvoters,	 ﾠand	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmacro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠ
need	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmicro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠlogic.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠdifferentiate	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠover	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠby	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ
class	 ﾠbut	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠof	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠvoters	 ﾠunder	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumptions	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠ
parties	 ﾠare	 ﾠneeded	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlegislative	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmajority	 ﾠchooses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ(we	 ﾠ
modify	 ﾠthis	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠbelow).	 ﾠ	 ﾠWe	 ﾠthen	 ﾠproceed	 ﾠto	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ“tips”	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠ
class	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠtoward	 ﾠfavoring	 ﾠeither	 ﾠmore	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠdetermines	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
relationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠpreferences.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠrefers	 ﾠto	 ﾠsecondary	 ﾠand	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐secondary	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠsince	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠis	 ﾠmandatory	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠand	 ﾠoverwhelmingly	 ﾠpublicly	 ﾠfinanced	 ﾠ(even	 ﾠthough	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠsector	 ﾠof	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠschools).	 ﾠOne	 ﾠreason	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠis	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠ
universally	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠexternalities	 ﾠof	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending	 ﾠ–	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
virtual	 ﾠrequirement	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠmodern	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbasic	 ﾠskills	 ﾠ–	 ﾠso	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠand	 ﾠupper	 ﾠ
middle	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠalways	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠschooling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlower	 ﾠclasses.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
compositional	 ﾠspending	 ﾠdata	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠall	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠcomponent	 ﾠnever	 ﾠexceeds	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠthird	 ﾠof	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠsharply	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠsecondary	 ﾠand	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠtertiary	 ﾠ
education	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠ1).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠassumes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠover	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠare	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠby	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐interest,	 ﾠ
broadly	 ﾠconstrued	 ﾠto	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠaltruistic	 ﾠconcerns	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠof	 ﾠchildren.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠrecognize	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
simplifying	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠused	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠtractability,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠit	 ﾠcaptures	 ﾠan	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ
important	 ﾠaspect	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠfunding.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠthink	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠdifficult	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐country	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠclass	 ﾠdivisions	 ﾠover	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠattention	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠshape	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐interest.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠacknowledge	 ﾠother	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠ
influences	 ﾠon	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠanalysis.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3.1.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠover	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠspending	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtypical	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠfamily	 ﾠhas	 ﾠone	 ﾠor	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠchildren,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠadults	 ﾠhave	 ﾠalready	 ﾠ
acquired	 ﾠan	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠhave	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠParents	 ﾠare	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠaltruistic	 ﾠand	 ﾠpay	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠchildren’s	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠbill.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠvoter	 ﾠnow	 ﾠhas	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
make:	 ﾠa	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠone	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠone.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠone	 ﾠis	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠto	 ﾠinvest	 ﾠprivately	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠchildren’s	 ﾠeducation;	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠone	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠor	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
education.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠwill	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠare	 ﾠinterconnected,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠover	 ﾠ
educational	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠmake	 ﾠin	 ﾠinvesting	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠAnsell	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠand	 ﾠassume	 ﾠthat	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐income	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
education	 ﾠsince	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsubsidization	 ﾠreduces	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠand	 ﾠenables	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
acquire	 ﾠan	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmany	 ﾠcould	 ﾠotherwise	 ﾠnot	 ﾠafford.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠgains	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlower	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠcome	 ﾠvia	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠmain	 ﾠchannels.	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠif	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠis	 ﾠuniversal,	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠredistributive	 ﾠ
component	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠup	 ﾠa	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthose	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlower	 ﾠend	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
distribution.
1	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠare	 ﾠinversely	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠability	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
parents	 ﾠto	 ﾠput	 ﾠup	 ﾠcollateral	 ﾠ(wealth	 ﾠand	 ﾠearnings)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠloans,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsavings	 ﾠof	 ﾠlower	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ
individuals	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsubsidies	 ﾠare	 ﾠgreater.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠfor	 ﾠupper	 ﾠincome	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠis	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreverse.
2	 ﾠThey	 ﾠpay	 ﾠmore	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠvia	 ﾠtaxes	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐income	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠand	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠchildren’s	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠprivately	 ﾠare	 ﾠlower.	 ﾠ
Furthermore,	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠeducated	 ﾠthemselves,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠlimit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠof	 ﾠskills	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
maintain	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠwage	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwant	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠeducated	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
enjoy	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpremium,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠothers	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame.	 ﾠA	 ﾠprivately	 ﾠfunded	 ﾠ
system	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠprovides	 ﾠeffective	 ﾠbarriers	 ﾠto	 ﾠless	 ﾠaffluent	 ﾠchildren,	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠ
raises	 ﾠthe	 ﾠreturns	 ﾠto	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐off.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠis	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠeconomically	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
preferences.	 ﾠOn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠa	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠreduces	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtax	 ﾠburden	 ﾠto	 ﾠfund	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
education	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlower	 ﾠclasses,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠcreates	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠwage	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠfor	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
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1	 ﾠA	 ﾠreviewer	 ﾠraised	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠit	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠrich	 ﾠdemocracies.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠSefton	 ﾠ(1997)	 ﾠshows	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK	 ﾠcase	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠ1993)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠratio	 ﾠof	 ﾠspending	 ﾠper	 ﾠperson	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠbottom	 ﾠquintile	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtop	 ﾠquintile	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠis	 ﾠ0.7.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠthen	 ﾠtake	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
UK	 ﾠin	 ﾠ1993	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtop	 ﾠquintile	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠ41.2%	 ﾠof	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠincome	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbottom	 ﾠquintile	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠ7.5%	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠ
.18	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtop	 ﾠreceived),	 ﾠthen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠclear	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeven	 ﾠa	 ﾠmoderately	 ﾠregressive	 ﾠtax	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠnet	 ﾠtransfer	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
bottom	 ﾠquintile.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
2	 ﾠAgain,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠassumes	 ﾠdemocracy.	 ﾠAnsell	 ﾠ(2010)	 ﾠproposes	 ﾠa	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠmass	 ﾠdemocracy.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
franchise	 ﾠwas	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠrestricted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwealthy	 ﾠthey	 ﾠfavored	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠas	 ﾠindustrialization	 ﾠproceeded.	 ﾠ
But	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfranchise	 ﾠwas	 ﾠgradually	 ﾠextended	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpoor,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠfavored	 ﾠ
private	 ﾠalternatives,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstarting	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠfor	 ﾠour	 ﾠanalysis.	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their	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠis	 ﾠsufficiently	 ﾠlow.	 ﾠMiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠvoters	 ﾠalso	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠintermediate	 ﾠskills	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠare	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠwage-ﾭ‐sensitive	 ﾠto	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠof	 ﾠskilled	 ﾠworkers	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlower	 ﾠclasses.	 ﾠ
On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠcredit	 ﾠis	 ﾠconstrained	 ﾠfor	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠsome	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
educational	 ﾠloans	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprohibitively	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmany.	 ﾠ	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠin	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠredistributive	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcould	 ﾠsway	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠsupporting	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
funding.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Given	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpivotal	 ﾠposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpreferred	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠcritically	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠside	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠcomes	 ﾠdown	 ﾠon.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠa	 ﾠkey	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠhow	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠdecide	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠpropose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠ
themselves	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠby	 ﾠpaying	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠthemselves.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠreason	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠa	 ﾠtax-ﾭ‐financed	 ﾠspending	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmainly	 ﾠ
benefits	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠstay	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
come	 ﾠto	 ﾠdepend	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠand	 ﾠwill	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠtaxation	 ﾠto	 ﾠfund	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠchildren’s	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠ
decides,	 ﾠthen,	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout?	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠassume	 ﾠhere	 ﾠthat	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠfor	 ﾠyour	 ﾠchildren’s	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠyields	 ﾠadvantages	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠschool	 ﾠ
choice	 ﾠand	 ﾠquality.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprivately	 ﾠfunded	 ﾠsecondary	 ﾠschools	 ﾠand	 ﾠuniversities,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠholds	 ﾠif	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠbarriers	 ﾠto	 ﾠentering	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠschools.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠUS	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠprime	 ﾠexample	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠtuition	 ﾠand	 ﾠfees	 ﾠat	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠschools	 ﾠare	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠfor	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠstate	 ﾠstudents,	 ﾠso	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
best	 ﾠschools	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠEngland	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠuniversities	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdiscretion	 ﾠto	 ﾠcharge	 ﾠfees	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠmaximum	 ﾠof	 ﾠ£9000	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠceiling	 ﾠis	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠrise,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwill	 ﾠresult	 ﾠin	 ﾠmore	 ﾠ
differentiation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠtiers	 ﾠof	 ﾠschools.	 ﾠ	 ﾠA	 ﾠdifferentiated	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinduces	 ﾠwealthier	 ﾠparents	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠspend	 ﾠon	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠtutoring,	 ﾠsummer	 ﾠschools,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠare	 ﾠconsequently	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠopting	 ﾠout,	 ﾠor	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
least	 ﾠsupplementing	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠwith	 ﾠyour	 ﾠown	 ﾠmoney.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠquality	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠgood,	 ﾠ
demand	 ﾠis	 ﾠrising	 ﾠin	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠprivately	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfalling	 ﾠin	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Yet	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaffordability	 ﾠof	 ﾠopting	 ﾠout	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠdepends	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠmany	 ﾠothers	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠ
affordability	 ﾠis	 ﾠdeclining	 ﾠin	 ﾠtaxes	 ﾠpaid	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠto	 ﾠpartially	 ﾠor	 ﾠfully	 ﾠopt	 ﾠ
out	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠschool	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠand	 ﾠpay	 ﾠ(some)	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthemselves,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠparents	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdone	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠreinforced	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠrising	 ﾠskilled	 ﾠwage	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠas	 ﾠlower-ﾭ‐income	 ﾠparents	 ﾠ
are	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠpriced	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠcan	 ﾠformalize	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠusing	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠor	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠcomplementarities	 ﾠgame	 ﾠ(originally	 ﾠ
outlined	 ﾠin	 ﾠSchelling	 ﾠ1978).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfor	 ﾠany	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠto	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠand	 ﾠpay	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
themselves,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠmass	 ﾠof	 ﾠother	 ﾠparents	 ﾠmust	 ﾠhave	 ﾠdone	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠall	 ﾠor	 ﾠmost	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠsend	 ﾠ
their	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠschools	 ﾠand	 ﾠpay	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠtaxes,	 ﾠonly	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠvery	 ﾠwealthy	 ﾠ
people	 ﾠwill	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠif	 ﾠa	 ﾠsubstantial	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠparents	 ﾠpay	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠalternatives,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtax	 ﾠburden	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠdeclines,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwage	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠincreases,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠcan	 ﾠafford	 ﾠto	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠ
on.	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsmaller	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsector	 ﾠmight	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠa	 ﾠselection	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsense	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquality	 ﾠ
difference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠschools	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠas	 ﾠmore	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwealthy	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
point	 ﾠat	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠattractive	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠto	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout	 ﾠthan	 ﾠto	 ﾠstay	 ﾠput	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠShelling	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
critical	 ﾠmass	 ﾠpoint.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠmass	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠlow	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwealthy	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwill	 ﾠrise	 ﾠas	 ﾠincome	 ﾠdeclines.	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For	 ﾠsome	 ﾠlow	 ﾠincome	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠwill	 ﾠnever	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreached	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhence	 ﾠnever	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
private	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠ
If	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠmass	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠ	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠsensible	 ﾠto	 ﾠconjecture	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
these	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠis	 ﾠinversely	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincome	 ﾠdistribution.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincome	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠis	 ﾠright-ﾭ‐skewed	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠmass	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠleft-ﾭ‐skewed,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠin-ﾭ‐built	 ﾠasymmetry	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
favors	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠover	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠprovision.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠillustrated	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ2	 ﾠ(although	 ﾠour	 ﾠconclusions	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
depend	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠskew).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠleft	 ﾠtail	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠjust	 ﾠa	 ﾠfew	 ﾠwealthy	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwho	 ﾠwill	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout	 ﾠ(when	 ﾠothers	 ﾠ
don’t),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsteeply	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠone	 ﾠreaches	 ﾠincome	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠfewer	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
fewer	 ﾠare	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout	 ﾠeven	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠmost	 ﾠothers	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠAgain,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠwill	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠnever	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout	 ﾠregardless	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
how	 ﾠmany	 ﾠothers	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠso	 ﾠa	 ﾠfully	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠis	 ﾠinfeasible.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠopting	 ﾠout	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ100	 ﾠpercent.	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠmass	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠin	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
opt	 ﾠout	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunction	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠy-ﾭ‐axis	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfrequency	 ﾠof	 ﾠopting	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
others	 ﾠdo).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ3	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ2	 ﾠtransformed	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠcumulative	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠfunction,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠx-ﾭ‐axis	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠwho	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
probability	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠopting	 ﾠout	 ﾠis	 ﾠrecorded	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠy-ﾭ‐axis.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprobability	 ﾠof	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠ
alternatives	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠequal	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠactual	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwho	 ﾠdo,	 ﾠequilibria	 ﾠare	 ﾠlocated	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ45-ﾭ‐degree	 ﾠ
line.	 ﾠBased	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ2	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠthree	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠequilibria.	 ﾠOne	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠone	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
middle,	 ﾠis	 ﾠunstable,	 ﾠhowever.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“tipping	 ﾠpoint”	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠany	 ﾠsmall	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
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set	 ﾠoff	 ﾠa	 ﾠcascade	 ﾠof	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠuntil	 ﾠone	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstable	 ﾠequilibria	 ﾠis	 ﾠreached	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠby	 ﾠarrows	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
figure).
3	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Note	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlocation	 ﾠof	 ﾠequilibria	 ﾠmay	 ﾠvary	 ﾠacross	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠmass	 ﾠ
points	 ﾠvaries.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠvaries,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠ
borrowing,	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠof	 ﾠfees,	 ﾠand	 ﾠso	 ﾠon	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmatter.	 ﾠOur	 ﾠargument	 ﾠis	 ﾠthus	 ﾠfully	 ﾠcompatible	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
continuous	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠas	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠonly	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠoutcomes.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠNetwork	 ﾠgame	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠstable	 ﾠequilibria	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
3.2	 ﾠPreferences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠspending	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Given	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠspending	 ﾠis	 ﾠso	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠacross	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
people	 ﾠabove	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠmass	 ﾠpoints,	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthey	 ﾠoppose	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠto	 ﾠvary	 ﾠsystematically.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠ
illustrated	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ3	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠwill	 ﾠbe	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠmost	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠschooling	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠa	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠmost	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠpublic).	 ﾠEmpirically,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcan	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshares	 ﾠopting	 ﾠout	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdivision	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠso	 ﾠthat	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠrising	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠspending	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠpublic.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3	 ﾠWe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠemphasized	 ﾠtaxes	 ﾠand	 ﾠwage	 ﾠpremia	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠcreating	 ﾠstrategic	 ﾠcomplementarities	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠtaxes	 ﾠto	 ﾠfinance	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠfall,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
so	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠopting	 ﾠout,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime	 ﾠas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠskill	 ﾠwage	 ﾠpremium	 ﾠrises),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthere	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠreinforcing	 ﾠ
social	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠacceptance	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠschooling	 ﾠrises,	 ﾠand	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠleft	 ﾠ
behind	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠincidence	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠand	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠ(“creaming”),	 ﾠ
which	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠundermines	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠetc.	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠall	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcomplementarities	 ﾠ
work	 ﾠto	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠleft	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“tipping	 ﾠpoint”	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
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But	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠanother	 ﾠkey	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠargument,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
preferences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠvaries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠusually	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠincomes	 ﾠwho	 ﾠhave	 ﾠreached,	 ﾠor	 ﾠare	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠmass	 ﾠpoint,	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠless	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending,
4	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠwill	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠmaintain	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠfinancing.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshort	 ﾠand	 ﾠmedium	 ﾠterm,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠopting	 ﾠout	 ﾠis	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠ
exogenously	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividuals.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠgood	 ﾠ(demand	 ﾠis	 ﾠrising	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
income),	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠis	 ﾠhigh,	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
associated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠeven	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐income	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwill	 ﾠfall	 ﾠ
short	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠmass	 ﾠpoint,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠdeprived	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠto	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ
way	 ﾠto	 ﾠsatisfy	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠand	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠvote	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠimprovement	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquality	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠshare,	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother	 ﾠhand,	 ﾠricher	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
prefer	 ﾠto	 ﾠspend	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠincome	 ﾠon	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠand	 ﾠoppose	 ﾠtaxes	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation.
5	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcontingent	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠspending	 ﾠis	 ﾠillustrated	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ4.	 ﾠEven	 ﾠ
though	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠno	 ﾠinherent	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠutility	 ﾠfunctions	 ﾠof	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠin	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠculture	 ﾠor	 ﾠbeliefs	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠto	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠat	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠis	 ﾠdeclining	 ﾠin	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincome	 ﾠscale,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠat	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠ
levels	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠis	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠin	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ
scale.	 ﾠNo	 ﾠother	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠspending	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠaware	 ﾠof	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthis	 ﾠimplication.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
4	 ﾠA	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠexception	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠis	 ﾠseen	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwealthy	 ﾠas	 ﾠinsurance	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthey	 ﾠcan	 ﾠno	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠafford	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthis	 ﾠinsurance	 ﾠmotive	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠweak,	 ﾠin	 ﾠpart	 ﾠ
simply	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠmovement	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠback	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠis	 ﾠrare.	 ﾠ
5	 ﾠAnsell	 ﾠ(2008)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠamong	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrich	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠis	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠis	 ﾠlow.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠassumes	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠis	 ﾠpublic,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthen	 ﾠwe	 ﾠagree	 ﾠsince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrich	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠ
spending	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠprovision	 ﾠis	 ﾠlow	 ﾠand	 ﾠdisproportionately	 ﾠbenefitting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrich.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠas	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
educational	 ﾠspending	 ﾠis	 ﾠredistributive	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠfootnote	 ﾠ1),	 ﾠthen	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠis	 ﾠpreferable	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
spending.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 11	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ4.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ
depending	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Note	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠslope	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠis	 ﾠdrawn	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsteeper,	 ﾠsuggesting	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠclass	 ﾠconflict.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠis	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlow	 ﾠincome	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠand	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠ
becomes	 ﾠde	 ﾠfacto	 ﾠmore	 ﾠredistributive	 ﾠas	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠincomes	 ﾠdo.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystems,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlower	 ﾠincome	 ﾠstill	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠredistributive	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠspending;	 ﾠeven	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
they	 ﾠmay	 ﾠoppose	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠat	 ﾠa	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwould	 ﾠsatisfy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠ
expectations	 ﾠof	 ﾠmiddle-ﾭ‐	 ﾠand	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐income	 ﾠgroups.	 ﾠAn	 ﾠintriguing	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠargument	 ﾠis	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠclass	 ﾠconflict,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠpartisan	 ﾠdifferences,	 ﾠare	 ﾠmuted	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystems.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠmay	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsuggest	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠcenter-ﾭ‐right	 ﾠcoalitions	 ﾠto	 ﾠfund	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic-ﾭ‐
financed	 ﾠsystems.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfirmly	 ﾠentrenched,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠspeak	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
long-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠpreferences.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠwe	 ﾠargue	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnext	 ﾠsection,	 ﾠin	 ﾠchoosing	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
poor	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlower	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠwill	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠa	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠburden	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ
can	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdisproportionately	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwealthy,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrich	 ﾠand	 ﾠupper	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠwill	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
system	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠoptions.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠpushed	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠfundamental	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
structure	 ﾠof	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic-ﾭ‐financed	 ﾠsystems,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠto	 ﾠoppose.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
3.3.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠof	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpostwar	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠwe	 ﾠargued	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠonce	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠis	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠenjoy	 ﾠbroad	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠof	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠfeedback	 ﾠeffects,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠmost	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
squeezed	 ﾠout.	 ﾠBut,	 ﾠagain,	 ﾠthese	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠare	 ﾠinduced	 ﾠby	 ﾠentrenched	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠinstitutions;	 ﾠthey	 ﾠdo	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠ“pre-ﾭ‐strategic”	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠitself.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
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middle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠcan	 ﾠgo	 ﾠeither	 ﾠway,	 ﾠa	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthere	 ﾠare	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠincentives	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
middle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠto	 ﾠlean	 ﾠin	 ﾠone	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠother.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠwould	 ﾠin	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠsolve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtipping	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠgame.	 ﾠ
Most	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrise	 ﾠin	 ﾠsecondary	 ﾠand	 ﾠtertiary	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠoccurred	 ﾠafter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtransition	 ﾠto	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠwas	 ﾠ
completed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearly	 ﾠ20
th	 ﾠcentury	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠmost	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠcases).	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠit	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠprior	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠshaped	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsubsidization	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ(Ansell	 ﾠand	 ﾠLindvall	 ﾠ2013),	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠour	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠis	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcoalitions	 ﾠwere	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace	 ﾠthat	 ﾠfavored	 ﾠrapid	 ﾠ
growth	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠspending	 ﾠwas	 ﾠfunneled	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
religious	 ﾠschools.	 ﾠBefore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSecond	 ﾠWorld	 ﾠWar	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠearly	 ﾠpostwar	 ﾠperiod,	 ﾠnational	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠwere	 ﾠhotly	 ﾠcontested	 ﾠpartisan	 ﾠaffairs	 ﾠ(Iversen/Stephens	 ﾠ2008;	 ﾠBusemeyer	 ﾠ2014).	 ﾠA	 ﾠ
key	 ﾠdemocratic	 ﾠinstitution	 ﾠthat	 ﾠshaped	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoutcome	 ﾠwas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠProportional	 ﾠ
representation	 ﾠ(PR)	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontinual	 ﾠEurope	 ﾠand	 ﾠScandinavia	 ﾠquickly	 ﾠadopted	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠentirely	 ﾠ
publicly	 ﾠfunded	 ﾠsystems,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthis	 ﾠwas	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠto	 ﾠsomewhat	 ﾠlesser	 ﾠextent	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠChristian	 ﾠdemocracy	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchurch	 ﾠremained	 ﾠstrong.	 ﾠBy	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠmajoritarian	 ﾠEngland	 ﾠand	 ﾠits	 ﾠsettler	 ﾠcolonies	 ﾠreserved	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
much	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠrole	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠschools	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
One	 ﾠway	 ﾠto	 ﾠunderstand	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠis	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠby	 ﾠIversen	 ﾠand	 ﾠSoskice’s	 ﾠ(2006;	 ﾠ2011)	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
coalition	 ﾠformation,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthat	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠof	 ﾠcenter-ﾭ‐left	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
center-ﾭ‐right	 ﾠcoalitions.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠproportional	 ﾠrepresentation,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass,	 ﾠrepresented	 ﾠby	 ﾠa	 ﾠcentrist	 ﾠparty,	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠenter	 ﾠa	 ﾠcoalition	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠ
representatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlow	 ﾠincome	 ﾠclasses.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠprediction	 ﾠrests	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrich	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠforced	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠpay	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlion	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠusually	 ﾠoutweighing	 ﾠany	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
wages	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeducated	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclasses.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠargued,	 ﾠonce	 ﾠthis	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpro-ﾭ‐spending	 ﾠcoalition	 ﾠraises	 ﾠ
taxation	 ﾠand	 ﾠforces	 ﾠup	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠopting	 ﾠout	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrich,	 ﾠ	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠkicks	 ﾠin	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠstable	 ﾠ
equilibrium	 ﾠemerges	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠschooling	 ﾠis	 ﾠmerely	 ﾠa	 ﾠniche	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvery	 ﾠwealthy.	 ﾠPublic	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠ
over.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠmajoritarian	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdynamic	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifferent.	 ﾠHere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠchoose	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
two	 ﾠparties,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠappealing	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ“median	 ﾠvoter”	 ﾠbut	 ﾠeach	 ﾠincorporating	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠconstituencies	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
either	 ﾠlower	 ﾠor	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠincome	 ﾠvoters.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsetting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠhas	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠwhat	 ﾠhappens	 ﾠ
if	 ﾠparties	 ﾠdeviate	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmedian	 ﾠvoter	 ﾠplatform,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcalculus	 ﾠis	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPR	 ﾠcase.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcenter-ﾭ‐left	 ﾠparty,	 ﾠif	 ﾠit	 ﾠdeviates,	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprevented	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠadopting	 ﾠa	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠimposes	 ﾠ
high	 ﾠtaxes	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠaddition	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠupper	 ﾠclasses),	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcenter-ﾭ‐right	 ﾠparty	 ﾠ
deviates	 ﾠit	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcut	 ﾠtaxes	 ﾠand	 ﾠthus	 ﾠpartially	 ﾠoffset	 ﾠthe	 ﾠloss	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠenables	 ﾠmore	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
middle	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠown	 ﾠchildren’s	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠAlternatively,	 ﾠcenter-ﾭ‐right	 ﾠparties	 ﾠwill	 ﾠallow	 ﾠ
some	 ﾠmixture	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwill	 ﾠgive	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠ
keeping	 ﾠdown	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠ(since	 ﾠthose	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠincome	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem).	 ﾠAs	 ﾠlong	 ﾠas	 ﾠtaxes	 ﾠare	 ﾠ
kept	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠlow,	 ﾠand	 ﾠskilled	 ﾠwage	 ﾠpremia	 ﾠhigh,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠupper	 ﾠincome	 ﾠparents	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
choose	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠalternatives.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠencourages	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠand	 ﾠupper-ﾭ‐middle	 ﾠclass	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame,	 ﾠ
setting	 ﾠin	 ﾠmotion	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠmodeled.	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠmacro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠargument	 ﾠthus	 ﾠbuilds	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠis	 ﾠinitially	 ﾠa	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠof	 ﾠtraditional	 ﾠ
partisan	 ﾠpolitics.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcontinues	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠin	 ﾠmajoritarian	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠthe	 ﾠleft	 ﾠis	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 13	 ﾠ
right	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠ	 ﾠBut	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠtwist	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstory	 ﾠin	 ﾠPR	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠeffect.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠspending	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠis	 ﾠfirmly	 ﾠshifted	 ﾠtowards	 ﾠa	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
upper-ﾭ‐middle	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠconcerned	 ﾠabout	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐quality	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠhave	 ﾠno	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠbut	 ﾠto	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠschools.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠin	 ﾠturn	 ﾠpushes	 ﾠright	 ﾠparties	 ﾠto	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ“first-ﾭ‐best”	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠ
being	 ﾠlow	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠPR	 ﾠtips	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠleft	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ4	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠpreclude	 ﾠ
subsequent	 ﾠcenter-ﾭ‐right	 ﾠcompromises	 ﾠover	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠintended	 ﾠto	 ﾠimprove	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquality	 ﾠof	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠ
education	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠopposed	 ﾠto	 ﾠmore	 ﾠredistributive	 ﾠspending	 ﾠtargeted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlower	 ﾠand	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠclasses).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
logic	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠnecessarily	 ﾠextend	 ﾠto	 ﾠother	 ﾠredistributive	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠthink	 ﾠthis	 ﾠhighlights	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠ
education	 ﾠis	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠunique	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠdomain.	 ﾠYet,	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmore	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠalternatives	 ﾠbeing	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
pensions	 ﾠand	 ﾠhealthcare	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcould	 ﾠchange.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Summarizing,	 ﾠour	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠtestable	 ﾠhypotheses:	 ﾠ
Hypotheses	 ﾠ1a	 ﾠ(Macro	 ﾠlevel):	 ﾠWe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠto	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠpatterns	 ﾠof	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
macro	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending	 ﾠis	 ﾠhypothesized	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠ(lower)	 ﾠin	 ﾠPR	 ﾠ
(majoritarian)	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠcontrolling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠother	 ﾠdeterminants.	 ﾠ
Hypotheses	 ﾠ1b	 ﾠ(Macro	 ﾠlevel):	 ﾠGovernment	 ﾠpartisanship	 ﾠis	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠmatter,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠonly	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong	 ﾠterm	 ﾠ
as	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠby	 ﾠitself	 ﾠconditioned	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠand	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠinstitutions.	 ﾠ
Hypothesis	 ﾠ2a	 ﾠ(Micro	 ﾠlevel):	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfeedback	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
education	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpublic-ﾭ‐dominant	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠincome	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
associated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠprovision,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposite	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
expected	 ﾠin	 ﾠprivate-ﾭ‐dominant	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠ(cross-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠeffect).	 ﾠ
Hypothesis	 ﾠ2b	 ﾠ(Micro	 ﾠlevel):	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhas	 ﾠfeedback	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠon	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠfor	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystems,	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
higher,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposite	 ﾠholds	 ﾠin	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsystems.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠnext	 ﾠsection	 ﾠseeks	 ﾠto	 ﾠtest	 ﾠthese	 ﾠimplications.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.	 ﾠEmpirical	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠ
Following	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠwe	 ﾠtest	 ﾠour	 ﾠargument	 ﾠin	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsteps.	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠanalyze	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmacro-ﾭ‐
level	 ﾠdeterminants	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠto	 ﾠdetermine	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠare	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠfinancing.	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠstudy	 ﾠhow	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠfeed	 ﾠback	 ﾠinto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠand	 ﾠattitudes	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmicro	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠstep	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
essential	 ﾠto	 ﾠour	 ﾠargument	 ﾠsince	 ﾠit	 ﾠtests	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠmechanism	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠintroduced	 ﾠ
above.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 14	 ﾠ
4.1	 ﾠData	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmacro	 ﾠanalysis,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠrely	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠComparative	 ﾠPolitical	 ﾠDataset	 ﾠcompiled	 ﾠby	 ﾠArmingeon	 ﾠet	 ﾠ
al.	 ﾠ(2011).	 ﾠAdditional	 ﾠdata	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠshare	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠis	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOECD	 ﾠEducation	 ﾠ
Statistics	 ﾠDatabase	 ﾠ(accessed	 ﾠvia	 ﾠOECD.stat).	 ﾠOur	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ
spending	 ﾠ(not	 ﾠspending	 ﾠas	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠas	 ﾠis	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠin	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠscholarship	 ﾠ(Ansell	 ﾠ2008,	 ﾠ2010;	 ﾠ
Busemeyer	 ﾠ2007,	 ﾠ2009;	 ﾠCastles	 ﾠ1989,	 ﾠ1998;	 ﾠSchmidt	 ﾠ2007)).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtype	 ﾠof	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠin	 ﾠArmingeon	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2011),	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠprevious	 ﾠwork	 ﾠby	 ﾠ
Huber	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ(2004).	 ﾠA	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“0”	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠa	 ﾠPR	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠa	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“1”	 ﾠa	 ﾠmodified	 ﾠPR/mixed	 ﾠsystem,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠ“2”	 ﾠa	 ﾠsingle-ﾭ‐member,	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠplurality	 ﾠsystem.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠfor	 ﾠseveral	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠexplanations.	 ﾠTwo	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠare	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpower	 ﾠ
resources	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠleft.	 ﾠWolf	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠidentifies	 ﾠunion	 ﾠdensity	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠdeterminant	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠshare	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠfunding.	 ﾠUnions	 ﾠhave	 ﾠan	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠin	 ﾠpromoting	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠ
education	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠensure	 ﾠopen	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠmembership.	 ﾠA	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
measure	 ﾠof	 ﾠ(short-ﾭ‐term)	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠpartisanship	 ﾠ(also	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠArmingeon	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2011),	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠ
values	 ﾠindicate	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠleft-ﾭ‐ward	 ﾠoriented	 ﾠgovernment.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠexpectation	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠleft-ﾭ‐
ward	 ﾠoriented	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠshare,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠshort-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠpartisanship	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ(network)	 ﾠfeedback	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠpartisan	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠonce	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠpublic/private	 ﾠdivision	 ﾠof	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠis	 ﾠestablished.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠgross	 ﾠenrolment	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠin	 ﾠtertiary	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠin	 ﾠproportion	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠage	 ﾠcohort	 ﾠ(taken	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠUNESCO	 ﾠdatabase	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠstatistics)	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠof	 ﾠdemand.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexpectation	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠ
levels	 ﾠof	 ﾠenrolment	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠspending	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠor	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠspill	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠdepending	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠelasticity	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠdemand.	 ﾠRelated,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠsize	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsector	 ﾠ(total	 ﾠoutlays	 ﾠas	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠArmingeon	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ
(2011)),	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsector	 ﾠmay	 ﾠcapture	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠforces	 ﾠthat	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠin	 ﾠexplaining	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠyet	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcaptured	 ﾠby	 ﾠany	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠother	 ﾠcontrols.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠ
relationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthese	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠis	 ﾠambiguous,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠtotal	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠ	 ﾠhelps	 ﾠus	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠunobserved	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠand	 ﾠtherefore	 ﾠreduces	 ﾠpotential	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠomitted	 ﾠ
variable	 ﾠbias	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠresults	 ﾠare	 ﾠsubstantively	 ﾠunaltered	 ﾠif	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexclude	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvariable).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Finally,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠseek	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCatholic	 ﾠChurch	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdevelopment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
educational	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠin	 ﾠsome	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ(Ansell/Lindvall	 ﾠ2013)	 ﾠby	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpopulation	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Catholics	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcritical	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠturn	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ19
th	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ20
th	 ﾠcentury	 ﾠ(taken	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠBarrett	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ
2001).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠexpectation	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠCatholics	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlower	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠ(Castles	 ﾠ1989;	 ﾠWolf/Zohlnhöfer	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠ
However,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠremember	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠmany	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠCatholic	 ﾠheritage,	 ﾠ
independent	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠschools	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠand	 ﾠsecondary	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠsector	 ﾠare	 ﾠactually	 ﾠfinanced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠmonies	 ﾠ(e.g.	 ﾠin	 ﾠFrance,	 ﾠBelgium,	 ﾠItaly	 ﾠand	 ﾠIreland).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmicro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠdata,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠISSP	 ﾠRole	 ﾠof	 ﾠGovernment	 ﾠIV	 ﾠdata.	 ﾠFieldwork	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠadministered	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2005/06.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠISSP	 ﾠdata	 ﾠis	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠquality	 ﾠand	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 15	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠcontain	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠasks	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠfor	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠ
regarding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic/private	 ﾠdivision	 ﾠof	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠfinancing,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠone	 ﾠ	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
comes	 ﾠas	 ﾠclose	 ﾠas	 ﾠany	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠaware	 ﾠof:
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 ﾠ
“Listed	 ﾠbelow	 ﾠare	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠareas	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠPlease	 ﾠshow	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠyou	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlike	 ﾠto	 ﾠsee	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠor	 ﾠless	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠspending	 ﾠin	 ﾠeach	 ﾠarea.	 ﾠRemember	 ﾠthat	 ﾠif	 ﾠyou	 ﾠsay	 ﾠ‚much	 ﾠmore’,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠtax	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠfor	 ﾠit.“	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ„Government	 ﾠshould	 ﾠspend	 ﾠmoney:	 ﾠEducation“	 ﾠ
Respondents’	 ﾠanswers	 ﾠare	 ﾠcoded	 ﾠin	 ﾠfive	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠ(from	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ“Spend	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠmore”	 ﾠto	 ﾠ5	 ﾠ“Spend	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠless”).	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠcollapsed	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfive	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠinto	 ﾠa	 ﾠbinary	 ﾠcategorical	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠ“1”	 ﾠif	 ﾠ
respondents	 ﾠstate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠshould	 ﾠspend	 ﾠ“more”	 ﾠor	 ﾠ“much	 ﾠmore”	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠ
“0”	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠremaining	 ﾠcases.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠadvantage	 ﾠof	 ﾠcollapsing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfive	 ﾠcategories	 ﾠinto	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠresults	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
statistical	 ﾠanalyses	 ﾠare	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠmore	 ﾠstraightforward	 ﾠto	 ﾠinterpret,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠaffect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠ
results.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠdisadvantage	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwording	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdistinguish	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠtypes	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
education	 ﾠ(academic,	 ﾠvocational,	 ﾠbasic,	 ﾠetc.),	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdivision	 ﾠof	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsources	 ﾠof	 ﾠfunding.	 ﾠYet	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassumption	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠmake	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠa	 ﾠgood	 ﾠproxy	 ﾠfor	 ﾠour	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠis	 ﾠfairly	 ﾠweak	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ5).	 ﾠWe	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠassume	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠmostly	 ﾠfall	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshaded	 ﾠcells	 ﾠin	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ5.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠsome	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐shaded,	 ﾠ
off-ﾭ‐diagonal	 ﾠcells	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠattenuate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠestimated	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠ–	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠsay,	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠharder	 ﾠto	 ﾠconfirm	 ﾠour	 ﾠhypothesis	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐-ﾭ‐	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbias	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwrong	 ﾠ
direction	 ﾠunless	 ﾠmore	 ﾠthan	 ﾠ50	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠfall	 ﾠinto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoff-ﾭ‐diagonal	 ﾠcells.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠseems	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
fairly	 ﾠinnocuous	 ﾠassumption.	 ﾠ
Figure	 ﾠ5.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠassumed	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠand	 ﾠunobserved	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠ
spending.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Preferences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ
(observed)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Less	 ﾠ More	 ﾠ
Preferences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ





	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Higher	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
We	 ﾠnext	 ﾠdiscuss	 ﾠour	 ﾠkey	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠvariables.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠis	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠin	 ﾠincome	 ﾠdeciles	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
make	 ﾠrelative	 ﾠincome	 ﾠcomparable	 ﾠacross	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠour	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠimplies,	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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 ﾠThe	 ﾠISSP	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠa	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠto	 ﾠuse:	 ﾠ“On	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwhole,	 ﾠdo	 ﾠyou	 ﾠthink	 ﾠit	 ﾠshould	 ﾠ
or	 ﾠshould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgovernment’s	 ﾠresponsibility	 ﾠto	 ﾠgive	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠuniversity	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐income	 ﾠfamilies?”	 ﾠ
Compared	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠis	 ﾠless	 ﾠabout	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠas	 ﾠsuch,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠmore	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
redistribution,	 ﾠsince	 ﾠit	 ﾠasks	 ﾠspecifically	 ﾠabout	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠstudents	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐income	 ﾠfamilies.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠany	 ﾠ
case,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcore	 ﾠfindings	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
existing	 ﾠdivision	 ﾠof	 ﾠlabor)	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠreplicated	 ﾠusing	 ﾠthis	 ﾠalternative	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠ(results	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠon	 ﾠrequest).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 16	 ﾠ
context	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠincome	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠor	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠTherefore,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠa	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠterm	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevailing	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠFurthermore,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
control	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmicro	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcontrast	 ﾠto	 ﾠincome,	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠis	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
positive	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠHaving	 ﾠgone	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠa	 ﾠlonger	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠmay	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠan	 ﾠexpression	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠpreference	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠeducation,	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfor	 ﾠone’s	 ﾠchildren.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠage,	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠa	 ﾠcurvilinear	 ﾠrelationship:	 ﾠIndividual	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠup	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠcertain	 ﾠ
age,	 ﾠeither	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠare	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠthemselves	 ﾠor	 ﾠ(expect	 ﾠto)	 ﾠhave	 ﾠ(young)	 ﾠchildren.	 ﾠOlder	 ﾠ
people,	 ﾠin	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠmost	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠprefer	 ﾠless	 ﾠ	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠon	 ﾠother	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠ
(Busemeyer	 ﾠet	 ﾠal.	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠWe	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠgender	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠadditional	 ﾠcontrol.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠwomen	 ﾠare	 ﾠnow	 ﾠmore	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠmen	 ﾠto	 ﾠattend	 ﾠcollege,	 ﾠyet	 ﾠstill	 ﾠearning	 ﾠless	 ﾠthan	 ﾠmen,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠmay	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
spending.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠa	 ﾠdummy	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠthat	 ﾠindicates	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠrespondents	 ﾠhave	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
not.
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 ﾠThe	 ﾠexpectation	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhaving	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠincreases	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending	 ﾠ.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthere	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠbe	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠmacro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠfactors	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠparents	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐parents,	 ﾠ
we	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsplit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsample	 ﾠin	 ﾠorder	 ﾠto	 ﾠassess	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠmacro	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠvaries	 ﾠacross	 ﾠ
subgroups.	 ﾠFinally,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcategorical	 ﾠindicators	 ﾠof	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠ(full-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠ
employed	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠbase	 ﾠcategory).	 ﾠ
At	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmacro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending	 ﾠto	 ﾠadjust	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠquo.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠpeople’s	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠare	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠquo	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
well-ﾭ‐known	 ﾠissue	 ﾠin	 ﾠcomparative	 ﾠopinion	 ﾠresearch,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠto	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠfor	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠlevel.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
addition,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠnet	 ﾠGini	 ﾠindex	 ﾠof	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠof	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠtaken	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠSolt	 ﾠ(2009)).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠline	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠMeltzer	 ﾠand	 ﾠRichard	 ﾠ(1981)	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexpect	 ﾠ
inequality	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠthan	 ﾠhalf	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠbelow-ﾭ‐mean	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠwill	 ﾠdemand	 ﾠmore	 ﾠspending	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠincome	 ﾠfalls.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠ
include	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnet	 ﾠGini	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsurvey	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠasks	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
preferences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhere	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpost-ﾭ‐fisc	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmatters.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Because	 ﾠof	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠdata	 ﾠavailability,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠsamples	 ﾠin	 ﾠterms	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠvaries	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠbit.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmacro	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠanalysis,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠcover	 ﾠAustralia,	 ﾠAustria,	 ﾠBelgium,	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠDenmark,	 ﾠFinland,	 ﾠ
France,	 ﾠGreece,	 ﾠIreland,	 ﾠItaly,	 ﾠJapan,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠNetherlands,	 ﾠNorway,	 ﾠPortugal,	 ﾠSpain,	 ﾠSweden,	 ﾠSwitzerland,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
US	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK.	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠand	 ﾠNew	 ﾠZealand	 ﾠhad	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠexcluded	 ﾠdue	 ﾠto	 ﾠmissing	 ﾠdata	 ﾠeither	 ﾠfor	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠ
spending	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠor	 ﾠtertiary	 ﾠenrolment.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠfor	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhave	 ﾠcomplete	 ﾠdata	 ﾠis	 ﾠ1997-ﾭ‐2008,	 ﾠ
although	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunbalanced	 ﾠpanel	 ﾠdataset	 ﾠalso	 ﾠcontains	 ﾠsome	 ﾠobservations	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠbefore	 ﾠ1997.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ
ISSP	 ﾠdataset	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠGermany	 ﾠand	 ﾠNew	 ﾠZealand,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠexcludes	 ﾠAustria,	 ﾠBelgium,	 ﾠGreece	 ﾠand	 ﾠItaly.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
order	 ﾠto	 ﾠmaximize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠlevel-ﾭ‐2	 ﾠunits	 ﾠ(countries),	 ﾠwe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinclude	 ﾠthree	 ﾠEastern	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠCzech	 ﾠRepublic,	 ﾠPoland	 ﾠand	 ﾠHungary).	 ﾠYet,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠwe	 ﾠ
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7	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠprecise,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠISSP	 ﾠdataset	 ﾠ(HHCYCLE)	 ﾠcaptures	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠcomposition	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
respondent’s	 ﾠhousehold.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠrespondents	 ﾠliving	 ﾠin	 ﾠhouseholds	 ﾠwith	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠare	 ﾠcoded	 ﾠ“1”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“0”	 ﾠotherwise.	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠtake	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠwith	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠnot	 ﾠliving	 ﾠwith	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠparents	 ﾠanymore.	 ﾠTherefore,	 ﾠour	 ﾠ
estimate	 ﾠcould	 ﾠunderestimate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠrespondents	 ﾠwith	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠattending	 ﾠuniversity,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠunfortunately,	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠbetter	 ﾠmeasure	 ﾠavailable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdataset.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 17	 ﾠ
include	 ﾠthese	 ﾠor	 ﾠnot.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠwe	 ﾠrestrict	 ﾠthe	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠto	 ﾠonly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcommon	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠour	 ﾠsubstantive	 ﾠ




The	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠaggregate	 ﾠdata	 ﾠposes	 ﾠserious,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐known,	 ﾠmethodological	 ﾠchallenges.	 ﾠPooled	 ﾠtime-ﾭ‐
series	 ﾠdata	 ﾠare	 ﾠoften	 ﾠplagued	 ﾠby	 ﾠserial	 ﾠautocorrelation	 ﾠof	 ﾠerror	 ﾠterms	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠcountries,	 ﾠpanel-ﾭ‐specific	 ﾠ
heteroskedasticity	 ﾠand	 ﾠcontemporaneous	 ﾠcorrelation	 ﾠacross	 ﾠunits	 ﾠ(countries)	 ﾠ(Beck/Katz	 ﾠ1995,	 ﾠ1996;	 ﾠ
Franzese/Hays	 ﾠ2008;	 ﾠKittel/Winner	 ﾠ2005;	 ﾠKittel	 ﾠ2006).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠour	 ﾠcase	 ﾠthe	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠaggravated	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠsome	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠvariables,	 ﾠmost	 ﾠimportantly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhistorical	 ﾠshare	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠCatholics,	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠchange	 ﾠover	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtime	 ﾠperiod	 ﾠwe	 ﾠconsider.	 ﾠTherefore,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠof	 ﾠthese	 ﾠ
independent	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsuppressed	 ﾠif	 ﾠcountry	 ﾠfixed	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠare	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠpick	 ﾠup	 ﾠany	 ﾠunobserved	 ﾠ
country-ﾭ‐specific	 ﾠconfounders.	 ﾠOur	 ﾠ(imperfect)	 ﾠsolution	 ﾠto	 ﾠthis	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠis	 ﾠa)	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠa	 ﾠclear	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠ
argument	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausal	 ﾠmechanisms	 ﾠlinking	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠoutput	 ﾠ(see	 ﾠabove)	 ﾠand	 ﾠb)	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
provide	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠspecifications	 ﾠto	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrobustness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfindings.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
More	 ﾠspecifically,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠemploy	 ﾠthree	 ﾠdifferent	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠspecifications:	 ﾠ1.	 ﾠA	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠthat	 ﾠuses	 ﾠpanel-ﾭ‐corrected	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠ(PCSEs,	 ﾠsee	 ﾠBeck/Katz	 ﾠ1995,	 ﾠ1996)	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠan	 ﾠAR(1)	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠto	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠfor	 ﾠserial	 ﾠ
autocorrelation	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠtime	 ﾠtrend	 ﾠvariable.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠalso	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠa	 ﾠtime	 ﾠtrend	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdeal	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
potential	 ﾠproblems	 ﾠof	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐stationarity.	 ﾠ2.	 ﾠA	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠwith	 ﾠPCSE	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠlagged	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠ
(Beck/Katz	 ﾠ1995,	 ﾠ1996)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠtakes	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠof	 ﾠautocorrelation,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠsuppresses	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexplanatory	 ﾠpower	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
other	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠ(Achen	 ﾠ2000).	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠA	 ﾠgeneralized	 ﾠleast	 ﾠsquares	 ﾠ(GLS)	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠcombined	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
AR(1)	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠto	 ﾠcorrect	 ﾠfor	 ﾠautocorrelation	 ﾠof	 ﾠerror	 ﾠterms.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmicro	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreferences,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠapply	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠmultilevel	 ﾠlogit	 ﾠregression.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
model	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠmacro	 ﾠand	 ﾠmicro	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠvariables,	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmultilevel	 ﾠstructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ
when	 ﾠestimating	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠ(individuals	 ﾠnested	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠcountries).	 ﾠOur	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠpredicts	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
association	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠmacro	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠand	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠ	 ﾠwhere	 ﾠ
average	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠare	 ﾠconditioned	 ﾠby	 ﾠmacro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠcontexts,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠrandom	 ﾠintercept	 ﾠmodel.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠimplication	 ﾠof	 ﾠour	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
private	 ﾠspending	 ﾠshare	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠincome	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(cross-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠinteraction),	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠrandom-ﾭ‐
slope	 ﾠmodel.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
4.3	 ﾠFindings:	 ﾠMacro	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ1	 ﾠpresents	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfindings	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmacro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠshare.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ
shows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠindeed	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠshare	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ
financing	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠ(Hypothesis	 ﾠ1a).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠshare	 ﾠis	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠlower	 ﾠin	 ﾠmajoritarian	 ﾠ
systems.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠon	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠrobust	 ﾠacross	 ﾠall	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠ
specifications.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpredicted	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠmoving	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠa	 ﾠfull	 ﾠPR	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠfull	 ﾠmajoritarian	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ(recall	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ
above	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthis	 ﾠindicator	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthree	 ﾠcategories)	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠshare	 ﾠin	 ﾠspending	 ﾠof	 ﾠ9.8	 ﾠ
(model	 ﾠ1),	 ﾠ9.9
8	 ﾠ(model	 ﾠ2)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ7.4	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠ(model	 ﾠ3).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠmean	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠshare	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠsample	 ﾠis	 ﾠ88.8	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ8.2.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpredicted	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠmagnitude	 ﾠof	 ﾠabout	 ﾠ
one	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠdeviation.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠbehave	 ﾠlargely	 ﾠas	 ﾠexpected.	 ﾠUnion	 ﾠdensity	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠand	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠas	 ﾠin	 ﾠWolf	 ﾠ(2009).	 ﾠA	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsector	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfind	 ﾠsome	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠgross	 ﾠtertiary	 ﾠ
enrolment	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠshare,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠsignificant.	 ﾠThere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠCatholics	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠshare,	 ﾠbut,	 ﾠcontrary	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
expectations,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠ(Wolf	 ﾠand	 ﾠZohlnhöfer	 ﾠ(2009)	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠfinding).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠreason	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
puzzling	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthat,	 ﾠas	 ﾠmentioned	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠreligious	 ﾠschools	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Catholic	 ﾠEuropean	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠare	 ﾠactually	 ﾠfinanced	 ﾠwith	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠmonies.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠany	 ﾠcase,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠshare	 ﾠremains	 ﾠrobust	 ﾠand	 ﾠsignificant.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Government	 ﾠpartisanship	 ﾠ(left-ﾭ‐oriented	 ﾠgovernments	 ﾠscore	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠon	 ﾠthis	 ﾠindicator)	 ﾠtends	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
positive	 ﾠeffect,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠsignificant.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠremember	 ﾠthat	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠ
institutions	 ﾠalso	 ﾠinfluence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpredominance	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠpartisan	 ﾠcoalitions	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong	 ﾠrun	 ﾠ(Iversen	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Soskice	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠFigure	 ﾠ6	 ﾠconfirms	 ﾠthis	 ﾠby	 ﾠdisplaying	 ﾠa	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠbivariate	 ﾠscatterplots	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐
term	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠcabinet	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠconservatives	 ﾠand	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠdemocrats,	 ﾠrespectively.	 ﾠA	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
democratic	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠparties	 ﾠis	 ﾠnegatively	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠfunding,	 ﾠ
whereas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠopposite	 ﾠholds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠconservative	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠparties.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠfigures	 ﾠconfirm	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
strong	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠpartisan	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠand	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠpolicies	 ﾠ(Ansell	 ﾠ2010;	 ﾠBusemeyer	 ﾠ2007,	 ﾠ
2009,	 ﾠ2014;	 ﾠIversen/Stephens	 ﾠ2008;	 ﾠWolf	 ﾠ2009),	 ﾠbut	 ﾠit	 ﾠholds	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐term	 ﾠrather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshort	 ﾠ
term,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠconditioned	 ﾠby	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠ(Hypothesis	 ﾠ1b).	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠdeterminants	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ(as	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP)	 ﾠ
instead	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠrobustness	 ﾠcheck.	 ﾠAccordingly,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠsign	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
coefficient	 ﾠestimates	 ﾠswitches,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsector	 ﾠis	 ﾠshown	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠless	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠ
spending	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠunion	 ﾠdensity	 ﾠis	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠHowever,	 ﾠas	 ﾠbefore,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
variable	 ﾠon	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠis	 ﾠthe	 ﾠonly	 ﾠone	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠrobust	 ﾠand	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠacross	 ﾠall	 ﾠ
model	 ﾠspecifications.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠpredicted	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠ(from	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠ1	 ﾠand	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ2)	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠchange	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠfull	 ﾠ
PR	 ﾠto	 ﾠfull	 ﾠmajoritarian	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠby	 ﾠ0.4	 ﾠpercentage	 ﾠ
points.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠsample	 ﾠmean	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthis	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠis	 ﾠ0.33	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠof	 ﾠ0.4.	 ﾠAgain,	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠpredicted	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠhas	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmagnitude	 ﾠof	 ﾠabout	 ﾠone	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠdeviation.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
8	 ﾠThis	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠis	 ﾠobtained	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfollowing	 ﾠformula:	 ﾠCoefficient	 ﾠof	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠ/	 ﾠ1	 ﾠ–	 ﾠCoefficient	 ﾠon	 ﾠlagged	 ﾠ
dependent	 ﾠvariable,	 ﾠas	 ﾠrecommended	 ﾠby	 ﾠKittel	 ﾠand	 ﾠWinner	 ﾠ(2002)	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠusing	 ﾠa	 ﾠLDV	 ﾠspecification.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ1:	 ﾠMacro	 ﾠLevel:	 ﾠDV:	 ﾠProportion	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (1)	 ﾠ (2)	 ﾠ (3)	 ﾠ
Dependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠ Public	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠ
Model	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠ PCSE-ﾭ‐AR(1)	 ﾠ PCSE-ﾭ‐LDV	 ﾠ GLS-ﾭ‐AR(1)	 ﾠ
Public	 ﾠshare,	 ﾠlagged	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 0.909***	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ (0.0413)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Government	 ﾠpartisanship	 ﾠ 0.127	 ﾠ 0.0127	 ﾠ 0.0978	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.237)	 ﾠ (0.124)	 ﾠ (0.158)	 ﾠ
Union	 ﾠdensity	 ﾠ 0.129**	 ﾠ 0.00750	 ﾠ 0.179***	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.0540)	 ﾠ (0.0113)	 ﾠ (0.0546)	 ﾠ
Public	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠ%	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠ 0.0548	 ﾠ 0.0634***	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.0147	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.0789)	 ﾠ (0.0147)	 ﾠ (0.0718)	 ﾠ
Gross	 ﾠtertiary	 ﾠenrolment	 ﾠ 0.0693	 ﾠ 0.000463	 ﾠ 0.0401	 ﾠ
(0.0484)	 ﾠ (0.0137)	 ﾠ (0.0280)	 ﾠ
Share	 ﾠof	 ﾠCatholics,	 ﾠca.	 ﾠ1900	 ﾠ 0.0589**	 ﾠ 0.00242	 ﾠ 0.0641**	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.0267)	 ﾠ (0.00384)	 ﾠ (0.0264)	 ﾠ
Majoritarian	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐4.890***	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.901*	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐3.702***	 ﾠ
(1.895)	 ﾠ (0.469)	 ﾠ (1.254)	 ﾠ
Time	 ﾠtrend	 ﾠ(year)	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.204	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.128)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Constant	 ﾠ 484.9*	 ﾠ 4.937	 ﾠ 78.67***	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (257.0)	 ﾠ (3.180)	 ﾠ (4.356)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Observations	 ﾠ 288	 ﾠ 282	 ﾠ 288	 ﾠ
R
2	 ﾠ 0.938	 ﾠ 0.955	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Number	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ
Standard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠin	 ﾠparentheses	 ﾠ
***	 ﾠp<0.01,	 ﾠ**	 ﾠp<0.05,	 ﾠ*	 ﾠp<0.1	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ
Table	 ﾠ2:	 ﾠMacro	 ﾠlevel:	 ﾠDV:	 ﾠPrivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ(percentage	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (1)	 ﾠ (2)	 ﾠ (3)	 ﾠ
Dependent	 ﾠVariable	 ﾠ Private	 ﾠSpending	 ﾠon	 ﾠHigher	 ﾠEducation,	 ﾠ%	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠ
Model	 ﾠspecification	 ﾠ PCSE-ﾭ‐AR(1)	 ﾠ PCSE-ﾭ‐LDV	 ﾠ GLS-ﾭ‐AR(1)	 ﾠ
Private	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠlagged	 ﾠ
level	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 0.970***	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.0288)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Government	 ﾠpartisanship	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.00249	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.00185	 ﾠ 4.26e-ﾭ‐05	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.00419)	 ﾠ (0.00327)	 ﾠ (0.00737)	 ﾠ
Union	 ﾠdensity	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.00562***	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.000197	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.00825***	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.000887)	 ﾠ (0.000150)	 ﾠ (0.00250)	 ﾠ
Public	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠ%	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.00624***	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.000718	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.00443	 ﾠ
(0.00195)	 ﾠ (0.000903)	 ﾠ (0.00351)	 ﾠ
Gross	 ﾠtertiary	 ﾠenrolment	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.000103	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.000242	 ﾠ 0.00124	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.000988)	 ﾠ (0.000237)	 ﾠ (0.00134)	 ﾠ
Share	 ﾠof	 ﾠCatholics,	 ﾠca.	 ﾠ1900	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.00241***	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.000208**	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.00271**	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.000573)	 ﾠ (0.000100)	 ﾠ (0.00121)	 ﾠ
Majoritarian	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠ
system	 ﾠ
0.177***	 ﾠ 0.0231***	 ﾠ 0.111**	 ﾠ
(0.0143)	 ﾠ (0.00690)	 ﾠ (0.0510)	 ﾠ
Time	 ﾠtrend	 ﾠ(year)	 ﾠ 0.0139***	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.00381)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Constant	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐26.98***	 ﾠ 0.0859*	 ﾠ 0.834***	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (7.554)	 ﾠ (0.0460)	 ﾠ (0.221)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Observations	 ﾠ 257	 ﾠ 239	 ﾠ 257	 ﾠ
R
2	 ﾠ 0.232	 ﾠ 0.950	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Number	 ﾠof	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠ 18	 ﾠ
Standard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠin	 ﾠparentheses	 ﾠ
***	 ﾠp<0.01,	 ﾠ**	 ﾠp<0.05,	 ﾠ*	 ﾠp<0.1	 ﾠ
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4.4	 ﾠFindings:	 ﾠMicro	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠlook	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevailing	 ﾠdivision	 ﾠof	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠfinancing	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
individual-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠincreased	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmicro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠ
variables	 ﾠperform	 ﾠmostly	 ﾠas	 ﾠexpected.	 ﾠWithout	 ﾠtaking	 ﾠinto	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠeffects,	 ﾠ
income	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠindividual-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending	 ﾠ
(model	 ﾠ1,	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ3).	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠreiterating	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠno	 ﾠother	 ﾠmajor	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠarea	 ﾠdisplays	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠlack	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠpreferences.	 ﾠ
Educational	 ﾠbackground	 ﾠ(years	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation)	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive,	 ﾠrobust	 ﾠand	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
support	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠWomen	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠof	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠsignificant.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfind	 ﾠevidence	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexpected	 ﾠcurvilinear	 ﾠrelationship	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠage	 ﾠand	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠLabor	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠpredictor	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠexcept	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠ
(unsurprising)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠstill	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠspending	 ﾠincreases.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠmacro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠcontrol	 ﾠvariables,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending	 ﾠ
has	 ﾠa	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠon	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠincreases.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠfind	 ﾠa	 ﾠrobust	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠand	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠ
significant	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠsocio-ﾭ‐economic	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠand	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
increasing	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠpredicted	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠresult	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ22	 ﾠto	 ﾠ36	 ﾠpoints	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠGini	 ﾠindex	 ﾠ(roughly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠ
between	 ﾠSweden	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS)	 ﾠis	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ53	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠto	 ﾠ83	 ﾠpercent.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠis	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnotion	 ﾠthat	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠspending	 ﾠis	 ﾠredistributive	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠborrowing	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠ
alternatives	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠas	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠability	 ﾠto	 ﾠprovide	 ﾠcollateral)	 ﾠdecline.
9	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠkey	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠ
share.
10	 ﾠThat	 ﾠis,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠimpact	 ﾠof	 ﾠhousehold	 ﾠincome	 ﾠon	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending	 ﾠvaries	 ﾠ
systematically	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprevailing	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠsystems,	 ﾠ
becoming	 ﾠricher	 ﾠis	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠan	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠwhereas	 ﾠ
it	 ﾠis	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠin	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsystems.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠis	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠ
graphically	 ﾠin	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠ7,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠone-ﾭ‐unit	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠincome	 ﾠ
(at	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmean)	 ﾠas	 ﾠit	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠshare.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfigure	 ﾠshows	 ﾠthat	 ﾠincome	 ﾠhas	 ﾠa	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠon	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠlow	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠshare,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
statistically	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠonly	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠshare	 ﾠis	 ﾠclose	 ﾠto	 ﾠzero.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmarginal	 ﾠ
effect	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠturns	 ﾠnegative	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠstatistically	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠshare	 ﾠis	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠ
than	 ﾠ20	 ﾠpercent.	 ﾠA	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠobserved	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠtertiary	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ(model	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ3).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
9	 ﾠThe	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠis	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ1	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ3.	 ﾠCalculations	 ﾠare	 ﾠbased	 ﾠon	 ﾠsimple	 ﾠlogit	 ﾠregressions	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
multilevel	 ﾠmodels,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSPost	 ﾠcommands	 ﾠin	 ﾠStata	 ﾠdo	 ﾠnot	 ﾠwork	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlatter.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
10	 ﾠAs	 ﾠan	 ﾠalternative,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠa	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmacro	 ﾠ
level.	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠinequality	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠshare	 ﾠare	 ﾠrelated,	 ﾠthis	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠproduces	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠ
results:	 ﾠIncreases	 ﾠin	 ﾠincome	 ﾠare	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠlower	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠin	 ﾠinegalitarian	 ﾠsocieties	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
vice	 ﾠversa.	 ﾠDetailed	 ﾠresults	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠprovided	 ﾠupon	 ﾠrequest.	 ﾠ	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The	 ﾠreversal	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠis	 ﾠquite	 ﾠremarkable.	 ﾠSo	 ﾠfar	 ﾠas	 ﾠwe	 ﾠare	 ﾠaware	 ﾠthis	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠno	 ﾠother	 ﾠ
spending	 ﾠarea	 ﾠand	 ﾠis	 ﾠimplied	 ﾠby	 ﾠno	 ﾠother	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠmodel.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfact	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
systems	 ﾠis	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠweak	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠcomposite	 ﾠof	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠlower-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠ
education	 ﾠand	 ﾠsubsidies	 ﾠtargeted	 ﾠto	 ﾠpoorer	 ﾠstudents,	 ﾠand	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠand	 ﾠmeasures	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠensure	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠquality	 ﾠ(such	 ﾠas	 ﾠlow	 ﾠteacher-ﾭ‐students	 ﾠratios).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlatter	 ﾠis	 ﾠobviously	 ﾠmore	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
those	 ﾠwith	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠincome.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠliked	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠable	 ﾠto	 ﾠdifferentiate	 ﾠclearly	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
redistributive	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“quality”	 ﾠaspects	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducational	 ﾠspending	 ﾠin	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystems,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdata	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
allow	 ﾠus	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠthat.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠincome	 ﾠon	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠincludes	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠtargeted	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐targeted	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠcomponent,	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontrast,	 ﾠ
high-ﾭ‐income	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠwill	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠview	 ﾠall	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠas	 ﾠredistributive.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
A	 ﾠsecond	 ﾠkey	 ﾠfinding	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrobust	 ﾠand	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠassociation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠ
share	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending	 ﾠand	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠincreasing	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠThis	 ﾠ
association	 ﾠholds	 ﾠindependent	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠwe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠshare	 ﾠfor	 ﾠall	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ
(models	 ﾠ1	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2,	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ3)	 ﾠor	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠtertiary	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠonly	 ﾠ(models	 ﾠ3	 ﾠand	 ﾠ4,	 ﾠrespectively).	 ﾠIncreasing	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠshare	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ5	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠ(roughly	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠNorway)	 ﾠto	 ﾠ30	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠ(the	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
US)	 ﾠis	 ﾠpredicted	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecrease	 ﾠin	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ77	 ﾠ
percent	 ﾠto	 ﾠ63	 ﾠpercent.	 ﾠA	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠsimulation	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠtertiary	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠyields	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
reduction	 ﾠof	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠ79	 ﾠto	 ﾠ60	 ﾠpercent.	 ﾠOf	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠimplies	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcausality	 ﾠruns	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠdirections	 ﾠsince	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠwill	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠ
even	 ﾠas	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠalso	 ﾠaffected	 ﾠby	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠOur	 ﾠdata	 ﾠ(from	 ﾠone	 ﾠyear)	 ﾠcannot	 ﾠtease	 ﾠout	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
recursive	 ﾠrelationship,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresults	 ﾠare	 ﾠconsistent	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠequilibrium	 ﾠpredictions	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmodel.	 ﾠ
As	 ﾠa	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠrobustness	 ﾠtest,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsplit	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsample	 ﾠin	 ﾠtwo:	 ﾠparents	 ﾠ(model	 ﾠ5)	 ﾠand	 ﾠnon-ﾭ‐parents	 ﾠ(model	 ﾠ6)	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
order	 ﾠto	 ﾠaddress	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠare	 ﾠstronger	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfirst	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠcompared	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
second.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠfindings	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtable	 ﾠshow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠby	 ﾠand	 ﾠlarge,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffects	 ﾠremain	 ﾠsimilar	 ﾠin	 ﾠdirection	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
terms	 ﾠof	 ﾠstatistical	 ﾠsignificance	 ﾠin	 ﾠboth	 ﾠsubgroups	 ﾠdespite	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠreduction	 ﾠin	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠcases	 ﾠ
for	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsubgroup	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividuals	 ﾠwith	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠ(although	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcoefficient	 ﾠestimate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠ
share	 ﾠturns	 ﾠinsignificant	 ﾠin	 ﾠmodel	 ﾠ5	 ﾠof	 ﾠtable	 ﾠ3).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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Table	 ﾠ3:	 ﾠDeterminants	 ﾠof	 ﾠmicro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (1)	 ﾠ (2)	 ﾠ (3)	 ﾠ (4)	 ﾠ (5)	 ﾠ (6)	 ﾠ
Dependent	 ﾠvariable	 ﾠ Support	 ﾠfor	 ﾠmore	 ﾠor	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠmore	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ(=1)	 ﾠvs.	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
less	 ﾠ(=0)	 ﾠ
Subsample?	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ Children	 ﾠ No	 ﾠChildren	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Micro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠ
Income	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.000157	 ﾠ 0.0516***	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.00326	 ﾠ 0.0472***	 ﾠ 0.0546*	 ﾠ 0.0613***	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.00980)	 ﾠ (0.0179)	 ﾠ (0.00990)	 ﾠ (0.0169)	 ﾠ (0.0294)	 ﾠ (0.0228)	 ﾠ
Gender	 ﾠ(female=1)	 ﾠ 0.0547	 ﾠ 0.0570	 ﾠ 0.0614*	 ﾠ 0.0643*	 ﾠ 0.167**	 ﾠ 0.0140	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.0357)	 ﾠ (0.0357)	 ﾠ (0.0364)	 ﾠ (0.0365)	 ﾠ (0.0673)	 ﾠ (0.0425)	 ﾠ
Having	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠ 0.312***	 ﾠ 0.308***	 ﾠ 0.306***	 ﾠ 0.301***	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.0392)	 ﾠ (0.0393)	 ﾠ (0.0401)	 ﾠ (0.0401)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Years	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ 0.0294***	 ﾠ 0.0282***	 ﾠ 0.0295***	 ﾠ 0.0283***	 ﾠ 0.0176*	 ﾠ 0.0309***	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.00496)	 ﾠ (0.00497)	 ﾠ (0.00507)	 ﾠ (0.00507)	 ﾠ (0.00931)	 ﾠ (0.00591)	 ﾠ
Age	 ﾠ 0.0165**	 ﾠ 0.0170***	 ﾠ 0.0178***	 ﾠ 0.0184***	 ﾠ 0.0450***	 ﾠ 0.0108	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.00652)	 ﾠ (0.00653)	 ﾠ (0.00670)	 ﾠ (0.00672)	 ﾠ (0.0170)	 ﾠ (0.00736)	 ﾠ
Age,	 ﾠsquared	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.000141**	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.000148**	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.000152**	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.000161**	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.000459**	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐8.47e-ﾭ‐05	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (6.77e-ﾭ‐05)	 ﾠ (6.78e-ﾭ‐05)	 ﾠ (6.97e-ﾭ‐05)	 ﾠ (6.98e-ﾭ‐05)	 ﾠ (0.000198)	 ﾠ (7.45e-ﾭ‐05)	 ﾠ
Part-ﾭ‐time	 ﾠemployed	 ﾠ 0.107*	 ﾠ 0.108*	 ﾠ 0.0975	 ﾠ 0.0987	 ﾠ 0.150	 ﾠ 0.0335	 ﾠ
(0.0619)	 ﾠ (0.0620)	 ﾠ (0.0643)	 ﾠ (0.0644)	 ﾠ (0.103)	 ﾠ (0.0794)	 ﾠ
Less	 ﾠthan	 ﾠpart-ﾭ‐time,	 ﾠ
out	 ﾠof	 ﾠlabor	 ﾠforce	 ﾠ
0.0405	 ﾠ 0.0453	 ﾠ 0.0301	 ﾠ 0.0368	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.0578	 ﾠ 0.0926	 ﾠ
(0.0628)	 ﾠ (0.0629)	 ﾠ (0.0641)	 ﾠ (0.0641)	 ﾠ (0.104)	 ﾠ (0.0809)	 ﾠ
Unemployed	 ﾠ 0.0558	 ﾠ 0.0748	 ﾠ 0.0415	 ﾠ 0.0617	 ﾠ 0.0463	 ﾠ 0.0791	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.0991)	 ﾠ (0.0995)	 ﾠ (0.0997)	 ﾠ (0.100)	 ﾠ (0.168)	 ﾠ (0.124)	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ 0.523***	 ﾠ 0.555***	 ﾠ 0.507***	 ﾠ 0.543***	 ﾠ 0.786***	 ﾠ 0.467***	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.135)	 ﾠ (0.136)	 ﾠ (0.136)	 ﾠ (0.137)	 ﾠ (0.247)	 ﾠ (0.165)	 ﾠ
Retired	 ﾠ 0.0374	 ﾠ 0.0501	 ﾠ 0.0293	 ﾠ 0.0461	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.299	 ﾠ 0.0509	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.0677)	 ﾠ (0.0679)	 ﾠ (0.0690)	 ﾠ (0.0693)	 ﾠ (0.234)	 ﾠ (0.0741)	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ Macro-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠvariables	 ﾠand	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠinteractions	 ﾠ
Public	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ
spending,	 ﾠ%	 ﾠof	 ﾠGDP	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐0.315**	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.319**	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.327**	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.340**	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.328**	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.313**	 ﾠ
(0.146)	 ﾠ (0.149)	 ﾠ (0.144)	 ﾠ (0.147)	 ﾠ (0.153)	 ﾠ (0.154)	 ﾠ
Socio-ﾭ‐economic	 ﾠ
inequality	 ﾠ(Gini)	 ﾠ
0.122***	 ﾠ 0.125***	 ﾠ 0.143***	 ﾠ 0.145***	 ﾠ 0.127***	 ﾠ 0.125***	 ﾠ
(0.0296)	 ﾠ (0.0300)	 ﾠ (0.0327)	 ﾠ (0.0332)	 ﾠ (0.0313)	 ﾠ (0.0312)	 ﾠ
Private	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
education	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠ
all	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠ
-ﾭ‐0.0375***	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.0284**	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.0195	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.0304**	 ﾠ
(0.0139)	 ﾠ (0.0143)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ (0.0153)	 ﾠ (0.0149)	 ﾠ
Income*private	 ﾠ
spending	 ﾠshare	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.00294***	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.00314**	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.00330***	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (0.000840)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ (0.00140)	 ﾠ (0.00106)	 ﾠ
Private	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
education	 ﾠspending,	 ﾠ
tertiary	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.0218***	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.0171**	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ




	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐0.00154***	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ (0.000412)	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Constant	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐1.593	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐1.795	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐2.145*	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐2.292*	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐2.127	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐1.679	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 25	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ (1.251)	 ﾠ (1.271)	 ﾠ (1.235)	 ﾠ (1.254)	 ﾠ (1.367)	 ﾠ (1.325)	 ﾠ
Variance	 ﾠ
components	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ 	 ﾠ
Level-ﾭ‐2	 ﾠintercept	 ﾠ
standard	 ﾠdeviation	 ﾠ
0.4106	 ﾠ 0.4167	 ﾠ 0.4056	 ﾠ 0.4122	 ﾠ 0.4124	 ﾠ 0.4288	 ﾠ
(0.0671)	 ﾠ (0.0680)	 ﾠ (0.0682)	 ﾠ (0.0693)	 ﾠ (0.0721)	 ﾠ (0.0710)	 ﾠ
Intra-ﾭ‐class	 ﾠ
correlation	 ﾠ
0.0488	 ﾠ 0.0502	 ﾠ 0.0476	 ﾠ 0.0491	 ﾠ 0.0492	 ﾠ 0.0530	 ﾠ
(0.0151)	 ﾠ (0.0156)	 ﾠ (0.0153)	 ﾠ (0.0157)	 ﾠ (0.0164)	 ﾠ (0.0166)	 ﾠ
Log-ﾭ‐likelihood	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐10,663.5	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐10,657.4	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐10,224.8	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐10,217.8	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐3,525.6	 ﾠ -ﾭ‐7,130.4	 ﾠ
Observations	 ﾠ 18,971	 ﾠ 18,971	 ﾠ 18,218	 ﾠ 18,218	 ﾠ 6,690	 ﾠ 12,281	 ﾠ
Number	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
countries	 ﾠ
20	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ 19	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ 20	 ﾠ
Standard	 ﾠerrors	 ﾠin	 ﾠparentheses	 ﾠ
***	 ﾠp<0.01,	 ﾠ**	 ﾠp<0.05,	 ﾠ*	 ﾠp<0.1	 ﾠ
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Figure	 ﾠ7:	 ﾠGraphical	 ﾠrepresentation	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcross-ﾭ‐level	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠincome	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠ
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5.	 ﾠDiscussion	 ﾠand	 ﾠconclusions	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠpaper	 ﾠaddressed	 ﾠtwo	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠresearch	 ﾠpuzzles:	 ﾠWhy	 ﾠdo	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠvary	 ﾠsignificantly	 ﾠwith	 ﾠregard	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠand	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠare	 ﾠthese	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠsustainable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
long	 ﾠterm?	 ﾠExpanding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠof	 ﾠIversen	 ﾠand	 ﾠSoskice	 ﾠ(2006),	 ﾠwe	 ﾠargued	 ﾠthat	 ﾠelectoral	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠ
play	 ﾠa	 ﾠcrucial	 ﾠrole	 ﾠin	 ﾠshaping	 ﾠdistributive	 ﾠcoalitions.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠPR	 ﾠsystems,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcenter	 ﾠparty	 ﾠrepresenting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
median	 ﾠvoter	 ﾠcan	 ﾠalign	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrepresentatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐income	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠto	 ﾠpush	 ﾠfor	 ﾠan	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ
system	 ﾠin	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠdominates	 ﾠas	 ﾠprovider	 ﾠand	 ﾠfinancier	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠmajoritarian	 ﾠsystems,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
median	 ﾠvoter	 ﾠforms	 ﾠa	 ﾠcoalition	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠparty	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠupper	 ﾠincome	 ﾠclasses,	 ﾠleading	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
private	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠOnce	 ﾠin	 ﾠplace,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfunding	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠfor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
spending	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠthe	 ﾠgreater	 ﾠthe	 ﾠshare	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmore	 ﾠexpensive	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠopt	 ﾠout.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠ
educational	 ﾠspending	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠnormal	 ﾠgood	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmeans	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠand	 ﾠupper-ﾭ‐middle	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠwill	 ﾠvote	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠspending	 ﾠis	 ﾠhigh,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠvote	 ﾠfor	 ﾠless	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠlow.	 ﾠThese	 ﾠfeedback	 ﾠ
effects	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠdistinct	 ﾠspending	 ﾠequilibria	 ﾠare	 ﾠpolitically	 ﾠsustainable	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong	 ﾠrun.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠassessed	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠvalidity	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠboth	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmicro	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmacro	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
aggregate	 ﾠdata,	 ﾠand	 ﾠfound	 ﾠconsiderable	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠfor	 ﾠboth	 ﾠconjectures.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠperspective	 ﾠis	 ﾠrooted	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrational	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠparadigm,	 ﾠalthough	 ﾠwe	 ﾠunderscore	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠ
character	 ﾠof	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠbut	 ﾠunderscoring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterdependencies	 ﾠof	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠbehavior.	 ﾠStill,	 ﾠ
there	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠother	 ﾠreasons	 ﾠwhy	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠvaries	 ﾠacross	 ﾠcountries.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠ
example	 ﾠcollective	 ﾠnorms,	 ﾠvalues	 ﾠand	 ﾠexpectations	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstate	 ﾠvis-ﾭ‐à-ﾭ‐vis	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠproviders	 ﾠ
could	 ﾠreinforce	 ﾠ(or	 ﾠcounteract)	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠlogic	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwe	 ﾠapply	 ﾠin	 ﾠour	 ﾠtheory.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠbelieve,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠindividual	 ﾠchoices	 ﾠand	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠare	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠextent	 ﾠdriven	 ﾠby	 ﾠmaterial	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐interest	 ﾠand	 ﾠnetwork	 ﾠ
effects,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠempirical	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠconfirms	 ﾠthis	 ﾠexpectation.	 ﾠWe	 ﾠalso	 ﾠtake	 ﾠaccount	 ﾠfor	 ﾠunexplained	 ﾠ
national	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠin	 ﾠpreferences	 ﾠto	 ﾠsome	 ﾠextent	 ﾠby	 ﾠcontrolling	 ﾠfor	 ﾠstudent	 ﾠenrolment	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠ
spending	 ﾠlevels.	 ﾠ
Our	 ﾠargument	 ﾠhas	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠhow	 ﾠwe	 ﾠexplain	 ﾠinequality.	 ﾠFirst,	 ﾠand	 ﾠmost	 ﾠobvious,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
composition	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠhas	 ﾠimplications	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsupply	 ﾠand	 ﾠdistribution	 ﾠof	 ﾠskills.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠhardly	 ﾠan	 ﾠ
accident	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpublicly	 ﾠfinanced	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠtend	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠless	 ﾠwage	 ﾠinequality,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠsuspect	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
decline	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrate	 ﾠof	 ﾠgrowth	 ﾠin	 ﾠcollege	 ﾠgraduates	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUS,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠexceptional	 ﾠrise	 ﾠin	 ﾠwage	 ﾠ
inequality	 ﾠas	 ﾠdocumented	 ﾠby	 ﾠGoldin	 ﾠand	 ﾠKatz	 ﾠ(2007),	 ﾠis	 ﾠclosely	 ﾠassociated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠrise	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
middle	 ﾠand	 ﾠupper-ﾭ‐middle	 ﾠincome	 ﾠparents	 ﾠwho	 ﾠopt	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠfor	 ﾠchildren’s	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠprivately.	 ﾠSecond,	 ﾠ
besides	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠof	 ﾠfinancing,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠset-ﾭ‐up	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠmight	 ﾠmatter	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠstratification	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠmay	 ﾠact	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠfunctional	 ﾠequivalent	 ﾠto	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠ
education	 ﾠspending.	 ﾠThus,	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠspending	 ﾠis	 ﾠabove	 ﾠaverage	 ﾠin	 ﾠcountries	 ﾠwith	 ﾠcomprehensive	 ﾠ
secondary	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelatively	 ﾠopen	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠ(USA,	 ﾠCanada,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠUK,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠ
also	 ﾠJapan).	 ﾠUpper	 ﾠincome	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠwilling	 ﾠto	 ﾠpay	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠchildren	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
goal	 ﾠof	 ﾠeffectively	 ﾠlimiting	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠ(elite)	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠin	 ﾠinstitutionally	 ﾠless	 ﾠstratified	 ﾠsystems.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
contrast,	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠis	 ﾠlimited	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠinstitutions	 ﾠin	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠsystems	 ﾠwith	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
high	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠstratification,	 ﾠi.e.	 ﾠearly	 ﾠtracking	 ﾠand	 ﾠa	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠdifferentiation	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠacademic	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
vocational	 ﾠeducation.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠneed	 ﾠof	 ﾠupper	 ﾠincome	 ﾠclasses	 ﾠto	 ﾠ“price	 ﾠout”	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmiddle	 ﾠor	 ﾠworking	 ﾠclass	 ﾠis	 ﾠless	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 28	 ﾠ
pressing	 ﾠin	 ﾠthese	 ﾠcases	 ﾠand	 ﾠin	 ﾠfact,	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠspending	 ﾠon	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠa	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠregressive	 ﾠ
redistribution	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlow-ﾭ‐	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigh-ﾭ‐income	 ﾠclasses.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠgeneral,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpossibility	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“opting	 ﾠout”,	 ﾠeither	 ﾠby	 ﾠpurchasing	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠalternatives	 ﾠor	 ﾠby	 ﾠgaining	 ﾠ
exclusive	 ﾠaccess	 ﾠto	 ﾠsuperior	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠservices,	 ﾠis	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠincreasingly	 ﾠshape	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠof	 ﾠmany	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠ
areas	 ﾠranging	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠpensions	 ﾠand	 ﾠhealthcare	 ﾠto	 ﾠchildcare	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠsafety.	 ﾠSince	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ1980s	 ﾠnew	 ﾠ
elements	 ﾠof	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠand	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠoptions	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠinjected	 ﾠinto	 ﾠmany	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠpolicy	 ﾠareas,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwe	 ﾠhope	 ﾠ
our	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠcast	 ﾠlight	 ﾠon	 ﾠhow	 ﾠthis	 ﾠmight	 ﾠalter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwelfare	 ﾠstate.	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠexceptional	 ﾠpolitics	 ﾠof	 ﾠeducation	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbecome	 ﾠthe	 ﾠnorm.	 ﾠTheoretically	 ﾠwe	 ﾠencourage	 ﾠa	 ﾠmore	 ﾠexplicit	 ﾠ
re-ﾭ‐consideration	 ﾠof	 ﾠHirschman’s	 ﾠinformal	 ﾠconjecture	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠinteraction	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ“exit”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ“voice”.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
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